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ABSTRACT: This paper contends that the role of a philosophy of history in the twenty first 
century is as a meta-discourse which explains and attempts to understand the role of history as 
part of human being-in-the-world.  Such a philosophy of history will not, as in the past, take the 
form of a universal history. Instead it will take a phenomenological approach which seeks to 
explore the historical enterprise as a means through which human beings attempt to come to 
terms with the fact that, despite their craving for being, they live in a world which is marked by 
becoming.  Change and its implications are at the core of any philosophy of history.  History is 
an attempt to master change and to keep its somewhat frightening consequences under control.  
Humans both crave being and stability and appreciate that change is their constant 
companion.  That is part of the tragic nature of human existence. 
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Philosophy of history is, in many ways, a curious enterprise.  At its most basic level the 
craft of history is supremely empirical in nature, as its practitioners sift through the 
available evidence and piece together a plausible explanation of what occurred in the 
past.  Whatever the more theoretical might think of such activity it is crucial if one is to 
have something resembling accurate history.  The astonishing thing is that it is 
extremely difficult to reconstruct an accurate narrative of the events of the Middle East 
in the first half of the seventh century, amongst the most significant fifty years in 
human history.1 
                                                          
1 James Howard-Johnston, Witness to a World crisis: Historians and Histories of the Middle East in the Seventh 
Century, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2011. 
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The question regarding the place philosophy of history, or historicism,2 has as a 
mode of historical understanding comes down to the issue of the role and purpose 
which it has as part of the wider historical enterprise.  The origin of it as a paradigm 
for understanding history can be traced in the eschatological-soteriological-messianic 
expectations of post-exilic Judaism which prompted the trend to identify allusions to 
future developments in the chronicles of the past. Judaeo-Christianity, strongly 
influenced by Hellenistic thought and practices,3 inherited such tendency and 
developed a particular understanding of the notion of Providence, already present 
among contemporary proponents of Stoicism,4  its role in the world and the limits of 
human free will. The fourth century works of Eusebius of Cesarea and of Augustine of 
Hippo epitomize the culmination of such development as they explain the relationship 
between God and the temporal world through the mystery of the Incarnation. Ever 
since, the quest of grasping the universal laws which lie beyond and govern the histoire 
evenementielle has characterised attitudes towards, and the interpretation of, the past in 
the West.5  The Western mind is, thus, essentially time-oriented as its understanding of 
the realm of experience is essentially cast within the framework of becoming and of the 
                                                          
2 The word ‘historicism’ has been variously used. In this paper it is assumed to mean the idea that the 
course of history is governed by laws which operate beyond reality.  
3 G Boccaccini, Il Medio Giudaismo. Per una Storia del Pensiero Giudaico tra il Terzo Secolo A.E.V. e il Secondo Secolo 
E.V., Genova, Casa Editrice Marietti, 1993). See also P. Sacchi , Storia del Secondo Tempio. Israele tra VI Secolo 
a.C. e I Secolo d.C, Torino, Societa’ Editrice Internazionale, 1994, pp. 279-453. 
4 The Stoic theme of Providence had been developed by Seneca in the treatise De Providentia. See in this 
regard, A.-M Guillemin, ‘Sénèque, Directeur d’Âmes’, Revue des Études Latines, 30 (1952), 202-19; 31 (1953), 
215-234; 32 (1954), 250-274. In the IX century, the Arab Muslim philosopher al-Kindi developed a theory 
of Providence in On the True Agent strongly influenced by Aristotelian and Stoic philosophy. See in this 
regard P. Adamson, ‘Al-Kindi and the Mu’tazila: Divine Attributes, Creation and Freedom’, Arabic 
Sciences and Philosophy, 13 (2003), 45-77. 
5 This does not mean that history of philosophy did not and does not exist in other cultures or civilisations. 
It depends on how cultures understand or conceptualise time or the realm of becoming. In Achaemenid 
Persia, for instance, Zoroastrianism developed a particular philosophy based on the notion of Zurvan 
(=Time) envisaged as the ruler of all things, a theory which led to the doctrine of predestination and 
which was at variance with the traditional doctrine of Free Will. See in this regard R. C. Zaehner,  Zurvan: 
A Zoroastrian Dilemma, New York, Biblo & Tannen, 1955. A perusal of religious cultures, however, seem to 
suggest that cultures which developed the idea of a transcendental deity vis-à-vis those who developed 
immanent understandings of the divine tended to develop a particular understanding of the past. Hindu 
Brahmanical schools, for instance, based their philosophical speculations on two key concepts: śāśvata-
vāda (eternalism) and ātman (unchanging self). This position prevents the development of any philosophy 
of history. Analogously the Buddhist idea of samsāra, or cycle of rebirths, although rejecting the idea of 
ātman, envisages such cycle as a result of past actions (karma). Each temporal individual life is a mere 
stage of a process. The cycle will end with the attainment of bodhi, or enlightenment, which leads to 
nirvana (permanent contentment). See R King, Indian Philosophy. An Introduction to Hindu and Buddhist 
Thought, Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press, 1999 
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phenomenal as it wrestles to move beyond them to grasp the eternal, infinite and 
immobile realm of Being. From the time of the early search for the arche of things of the 
Pre-Socratic philosophers to the debate concerning the Universalia of Medieval thinkers 
to contemporary theories regarding the origins of the Universe6, the Western mind has 
constantly struggled to overcome the ‘imperium of Chronos’ and the limits of language. It 
is for this reason that the West has fallen ultimately victim to an inevitable ‘metaphysics 
of presence’.7 
This particular understanding of the past, although inherently optimistic, since its 
main objective is to predict the course of historical evolution in a favourable light, has 
contributed to engendering a sense of arrogant superiority and entitlement, or has been 
used as a means to justify the ever-increasing dominance of the West over the peoples 
of the earth.  History has often been seen to be on the side of Western values as the 
course of history seemed to indicate that it favoured the victory of those values over all 
others.8  Such a view was helped by the fact that the history of the West, be it Europe, 
America or other Western outgrowths, was far better documented, written about and 
hence known than the history of the Rest.  Both history and philosophy of history 
were, and still are, quintessentially Western enterprises. 
This paper will argue that the days when Western superiority was taken for granted 
are long gone and that with them has gone a philosophy of history which has as its 
major objective the creation of a meta-narrative explaining why the history of 
humanity moved relentlessly towards Western dominance.  When Francis Fukuyama 
declared the end of history over twenty five years ago what he can be seen as 
proclaiming was the end of philosophical history understood as the history of the 
West.9  It was equally an expression of the fundamentally eschatological nature of 
history as practised in the West, as the latter had reached ‘the end of Time.’10  This 
does not mean that the need for a meta-understanding of history has become 
                                                          
6 See for instance: S Hawking, A Brief History of Time. From the Big Bang to Black Holes, London, Bantam 
Books, 1988  
7 The attempt by Derrida and others to oppose to the ‘metaphysics of presence’ a ‘metaphysics of 
difference’ has had the effect of generating conceptual dichotomies which ultimately amount to a 
tautology as they both are unable to transcend the limits imposed by language. Both are, in fact, 
paradigms which are founded on the negation of the premises of the other.  For the paradigm of 
‘metaphysics of difference’ see J Derrida, Writing and Difference, London/New York, Routledge, 2001 
[1978], pp.  97-192. 
8 Philippe Nemo, What is the West?, Trans. Kenneth Casler, Pittsburgh, Dusquene University Press, 2006 
9 Francis Fukuyama, The End of history and the Last Man, New York, Free Press, 2006 
10 Gregory Melleuish & Susanna Rizzo, ‘From Secular Temporality to Post-Secular Timelessness: 
Trekking the Past’s Future and Future’s Past,’ Telos, 163, Summer 2013, 39–60 
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redundant.  Rather, it means that the role and purpose of philosophy of history needs 
to be re-thought especially because it appears that the West has entered into a post-
historical era in which progress has become routine. As this routinisation of progress, 
produced by the numerous aspects of human life being re-made in a technological 
fashion, is characterised by an inherent immobility, it voids the possibility of history.11 
Consequently we argue that in order to overcome such an impasse a philosophy of 
history must be primarily phenomenological in nature as it explores the nature of the 
historical enterprise, its motivation and purpose and, especially, the limitations and 
contradictions involved in the pursuit of historical knowledge.  Philosophy of history 
puts history in its place; it is a meta-historical project. 
In days gone by philosophy of history was less complicated than it is today.  In the 
West, only the history of what might be termed extended Europe was known in any 
great detail, as well as selected areas of the ancient world, especially Israel, Greece and 
Rome.  Large parts of the world were dismissed as having no history, and, in the flush 
of optimistic hubris created by the Enlightenment and European imperialism it was 
assumed that the ‘torch of history’ had been placed firmly in Europe’s safe hands.12 It 
has become a common refrain that Europe has been the creator, architect and exporter 
of a wide array of value-laden institutions or traditions such as democracy, capitalism, 
sovereignty, freedom and individualism, along with emotions such as courtly love, 
friendship, philanthropy and patriotism. However, it has been demonstrated that such 
institutions and emotions can be found in many other non-western societies.13  
Philosophy of history has largely been a European/Western enterprise largely 
carried out at a time when Europe and then America have been the dominant powers 
in the world.  1066 and All That concludes when Britain has been superseded by 
America as the dominant power in the world.14 In a philosophy of history that is 
primarily and essentially Eurocentric in nature, all roads lead to 1945, namely to the 
‘end of history’ considered as the end of European dominance in the world. 
This does not mean that the idea of Philosophy of History is a purely Western 
invention and hence only applicable in a Western context, and consequently now 
                                                          
11 For the idea of the post-historical see A Gehlen,  Man in the Age of Technology, trans. P. Lipscomb, (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1980 [1957], ; cf. A Gehlen, (1967), ‘Die Säkularisierung des 
Fortschritts’, in Rehburg K.S. (ed.), Einblicke, vol. VII, Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1978. 
12 E R Wolf, Europe and the People without History, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1982 
13 See in this regard M. Elvin, The Pattern of Chinese Past, Redwood, Stanford University Press, 1973: W M 
Watt, The Influence of Islam on Medieval Europe, Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press 1972; W M Weiss. & 
K.M. Westerman, The Bazaar: Markets and Merchants of the Islamic World, London, Thames and Hudson, 
1998; Jack Goody, The Theft of History, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2006 
14 Walter Carruthers Sellar & Robert Julian Yeatman, 1066 and All That, London: Methuen, 1930 
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discredited.  Certainly, it does not imply that one cannot determine if there is a viable 
philosophy of history which can be applied to the history of the whole of humanity.  It 
simply means that in the twenty first century the nature of philosophy of history is not 
as clear cut as it was one hundred years ago. 
The conceptual paradigm known as ‘Philosophy of history’ or ‘historicism’ is 
largely the product of the attempt of the European West to buttress its claims to an 
inherent superiority vis-à-vis the rest of the world, and to legitimate and justify its 
intellectual and political ascendancy and authority. Historicism is therefore a 
hermeneutics or interpretative method which attempts to predict the future course of 
human development. Its inherent aim, as Karl Popper argues, is to identify the rhythms 
or patterns, laws or trends which cause or lie behind the evolution of history.15 From 
Heraclitus to Plato, to Hegel, Marx and Croce the central and often unspoken 
assumption has been that humanity, since its inception, is on a march towards some 
pre-established end, and that it was this march which conferred meaning to the 
existence of mankind.  The basic idea, therefore, was one of evolution and progression 
through time, although the essence of humanity and the world remained the same. It is 
in this tension between history as change, as ‘becoming’, and human essence and the 
essence of human things as unchangeable or identical entities that the apparent aporias, 
generated by a philosophy of history, come to the fore. We emphasise ‘apparent’ as the 
essence of a thing can only be identified, defined and known through its changes.16 
Static modes of being or cyclic reiteration typical of nature, because finite and hence 
lacking discontinuities, cannot produce knowledge: the latter is the product of change, 
generated by the unresolved and fluid tension between opposites. As Hegel once 
observed17, the time of nature is static and not creative and this explains why the birth 
of self-consciousness is to be sought in the fragmentation of being caused by a 
structural conflict with nature. The birth of self-consciousness prompted the naissance 
of History or of the becoming, the locus in which the entelechy of that lost primordial 
unity could manifest itself.  Thus, history is a development which takes place in time, 
while nature is one which takes place in space. The primordial rupture therefore is one 
between linearity, or progress, typical of history, and circularity or of the eternal return 
of the same which characterises nature.   
Although Nominalism triumphed in the late Middle Ages thus paving the way to 
the great scientific discoveries or ‘revolutions’ between the sixteenth and eighteenth 
                                                          
15 K. Popper, The Poverty of Historicism, London/New York, Routledge, 2002 [1957] p. 3. 
16 Popper, The Poverty of Historicism, pp. 23-30. 
17 G.W.F. Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of History, trans. J. Sibree, New York, Dover Publications, 1956, 
[1833-1836] 
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centuries, it appears that Realism or Essentialism continued to dominate western 
conceptualisation of reality and contributed to the development of historicist thought. 
The persistence of essentialism is largely connected with the nature of human language 
which orders and structures reality in a particular way. Heraclitus claimed, in fact, that 
logos, ‘reason’, ‘intelligence’ or ‘language, is the rule in accordance with which all things 
are realised and the law which is common to and governs all things.18  It is in the fold 
of language that the polarity of History-Nature, namely of time and space, that being 
can finally attempt recovering its original unity of essence and existence by 
reconfiguring itself as Dasein, as ‘being-in-the-world’.19 
Historicism has thus been and continues to be fundamentally an ‘essentialist 
project’ as it attempts to moor language to the reality of being notwithstanding the 
congenital transience and temporality of human life and of the world. Failure to do so 
would have conferred ontological autonomy to language so that it could be used to 
fragment and disperse reality in a set of autonomous and solipsistic aphorisms and 
undermine any attempt to legitimate certain power structures such as the State. 20 As 
Plato points out, the artful use of language, which is not anchored to reality, produces 
‘apparent truths’ or ‘verisimilitudes’, distortions of reality or fantasies.21 Albeit its claims 
to the contrary, historicism is far from being connected with the search for some 
absolute truth, but is rather an attempt to define, affirm and consolidate a particular 
understanding of the world and of human life through the weaving of an infinite 
narrative. 
In weaving this narrative the creation of a philosophy of history is largely a 
rationalist enterprise in that it must be constructed by the human mind using a 
combination of deduction, imagination, intuition and logic.  But it is also inductive in 
the sense that it can be falsified by empirical evidence.  This is important because there 
are two things which characterise human history.  The first is what appears to be an 
almost overwhelming variety in terms of the paths that particular human civilisations, 
societies and cultures have taken.  The second are what look like regularities which 
intrude into that variety, allowing for certain patterns to be discerned within a 
meaningless chaos.  Of course, those patterns may be an illusion created by an over-
active imagination and may be disproved by subsequent investigation.  Any philosophy 
                                                          
18 R. Mondolfo, ‘Il Logos Eracliteo e le sue Interpretazioni’, in E. Zeller & R.Mondolfo, La Filosofia dei 
Greci nel suo Sviluppo Storico, I, 4, Firenze: La Nuova Italia, 1967, pp.  152-156. 
19 Heidegger M., Being and Time, Oxford, Blackwell, 1978 
20 This aspect of language is amply developed by Plato in his dialogue Gorgias. Plato: Gorgias, Menexenus, 
Protagoras, Trans. Tom Griffith, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010. 
21 Plato, Gorgias, 463b, p. 28 
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of history can only ever be a work-in-progress because there will always be new 
historical data emerging.  This follows from the fact that history is itself a work-in-
progress. Philosophy of history must come to terms with the ever-increasing number of 
narratives that emerge about the human past. 
When discussing history, there are two things to which one might be making 
reference.  One is a thing in the real world to which the term ‘History’ may be 
attached.  The other is the human creation which seeks to make sense of change over 
time and which may take the general term of ‘history’.  In this second sense ‘history’ 
can take many forms according to the mode which is used to account for that change 
over time.  Hegel called these two forms of history respectively ‘original history’ and 
‘reflective history’. There may, or may not, be ‘History’ in the first sense but it is 
impossible for human beings to know if there is a thing termed ‘History’ because such 
a thing can only be discerned by someone who had a God like view of the universe 
and which the German philosopher referred to as ‘philosophical history’.22 
This means that as human beings we are left with the second notion of history, and 
all the limitations which it implies for what can be said about history.   For example, 
such an approach must recognise that history as such is not limited to a single mode of 
expression and may include not only a range of literary genres but also such things as 
films and plays.  It also implies that any attempt at a philosophy of history will be 
subject to the same conditions as any attempt to write a history; it will be partial and 
skewed towards a particular viewpoint which comes out of the time and place from 
where the person composing the history comes. This mode of history, which is both 
pragmatic and critical in a Hegelian sense, will be always and inevitably about the 
present.  For better or for worse, all human beings are creatures of the present even as 
they cast their nets out in search of the past and the future. 
Edward Hallett Carr had already foreshadowed this development in the study of 
history in his celebrated work What is History? of 1961 when he stated that history is a 
dialogue not only between past and present, but past, present and progressively 
emerging goals,23 and that history is nothing but a “selective system of cognitive and 
casual orientations to reality”.24 These statements implicitly deny the possibility of a 
philosophy of history which aims at identifying inherent laws of causation in order to 
predict the course of history. There is, in fact, no such thing as historical inevitability. 
On the contrary, as Ricoeur suggests, historical narratives merely reveal the temporal 
nature of human life. They disclose previous, long-gone worlds and are quintessentially 
                                                          
22 Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of History, p. 8 
23 E.H. Carr, What is History?, London, Penguin, 1990 [1961], pp. 123-124. 
24 Carr, What is History?, p. 105. 
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provisional in nature as the discovery of new facts and theories or the application of a 
different hermeneutics may tout court alter their understanding, thus inherently 
signifying that even present and personal ideas and facts are amenable to ongoing 
scrutiny and change.  Thus the study of history configures itself more an attempt to 
self-understanding and to the discovery of new possibilities,25 rather than the discovery 
of some immutable, eternal law operating beyond the pale of events. 
It is also clear that philosophy of history should not to be confused with what might 
be termed universal history or an attempt to put all human history together to form a 
single pattern leading from past to present to future.  As we have argued elsewhere, 
universal history is not universal but partial in the sense that it tends to be linked to a 
desire to create a common humanity and appears to be prevalent in times of empire.26 
The work of Polybius is emblematic in this regard. However, it must be pointed out 
that both universal and non-universal histories require a philosophical foundation.  A 
philosophy of history must deal with the mode of human understanding which is called 
history.27 
A philosophy of history must go deeper than the surface of history and beyond the 
phenomenal; it must look at the basis of history as a way of approaching the world, as a 
practice in which humans engage, and explaining why they engage in it. For this 
reason, the approach must be a phenomenological one as it seeks to go beyond that 
which is directly given in the realm of experience.28  The key to any such appreciation 
of history, in fact, lies in the relationship of being and becoming, and the reality that all 
human existence is organically temporal.  Time and change dominate the lives of all 
human beings.  History can be envisaged as a means of coming to terms with that 
change, ostensibly in terms of the past, but also in relation to both the present and the 
future.  It is about the reality, the terrible reality for finite beings, of growth, decay–and 
death. For example, when the ‘Father of History’, Herodotus, wrote his account of the 
Persian Wars, his enquiry was not just a celebration of what the Athenians had 
achieved in the past but also a warning regarding the possible future of the Athenian 
                                                          
25 P. Ricoeur, Time and Narrative, vol. I, ( Chicago, IL.: University of Chicago Press, 1984-88), p. 155. Cf. 
also P. Ricoeur, Oneself as Other, ( Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1992 [1990]); and History and 
Truth,  (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1965 [1955]). Cf. A.  MacIntyre, ‘Epistemological 
Crises, Dramatic Narrative and the Philosophy of Science’, The Monist, 60, 4, 1977, pp. 453-472. 
26 Greg Melleuish, ‘The Particularity of Universal History’, Telos, forthcoming 
27 Michael Oakeshott, Experience and its Modes, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1985  pp. 86–168 
28 See in this regard F Brentano, Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint, London/New York, Routledge, 
1995 [1874], M. Merleau-Ponty, The Phenomenology of Perception, London/New York, Routledge; 1995 
[1945], and M Heidegger,  Being and Time, Oxford, Blackwell, 1978) 
 COSMOS AND HISTORY 300 
empire.29  
Of course, change can be disturbing, even frightening, which is why Thucydides 
can attribute moral decay to the behaviour of the Athenians in the Melian dialogue.30  
If democracy can be seen as the cause of Athenian energy, vitality, and their move 
away from traditional norms governing behaviour based on the aristocratic virtue or 
ideal of areté, then Plato’s static ideal of the state (Politeia) can be seen as an attempt to 
banish time, the source of such energy and vitality, and its corrosive effects, from the 
world of humanity.  
In all of this, the act of recording and the interpretation of what has happened in 
the form of an ‘historical narrative’ are of prime importance.  Human memory is 
notoriously unreliable and the past can easily be re-made as individuals change their 
versions of what took place in the past.  This can be done unconsciously in an oral 
society which lives primarily and ad infinitum in an apparently unchanging present as its 
knowledge of the past is dependent on memory reformulated and transmitted from one 
generation to the other and there is no authoritative, fixed account against which that 
memory can be evaluated.31  Written accounts of the past, which come to constitute 
history, establish a form of authority which can only grow with time as the chain of 
memory is broken. These textual or discursive discontinuities constitute the essence of 
history. These written accounts, in fact, become the past and can only be challenged by 
other written documents, or possibly material evidence, the sole authority legitimated 
to challenge those accounts.  History is not what actually happened but what written 
accounts and other evidence lead us to believe what happened. They cannot exist 
without the human imagination as their midwife.  Thus, history is, most of the time, 
more fiction than fact. 
 The paradigm or discourse referred to as ‘Philosophy of history’ then cannot be 
concerned with the process of history in se et per se as if it were an objective thing 
awaiting the magic wand of the philosopher to make sense of it.  As a source of 
authority which has congealed the ambiguities of the past into something seemingly 
solid and fixed, historical works often conceal how very shaky their foundations are.  As 
well as the partiality of the historian, any would-be philosopher of history has to 
contend with the reality that no work of history can be authoritative forever, being 
always open to revision. The historical work is in itself the product of history, an 
inescapable tautology with which all historians and philosophers of history must 
                                                          
29 James Romm, Herodotus, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1998, p. 53 
30 Thucydides, The Landmark Thucydides, Ed. Robert B. Strassler, New York, Free Press, 1996, pp. 351–7 
31 Jack Goody, The Domestication of the Savage Mind, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1976, pp. 36–
51 
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contend.  One cannot but wince when reading a work such as Hegel’s Philosophy of  
History which is little more than a fantastical account of the history of the world, as he 
attempts to write a ‘philosophical history’.  Analogously it can be said of all the 
nineteenth and twentieth century universal histories with their extraordinary 
Eurocentric accounts of the historical process which reflect nothing more than the 
increasing dominance of Europe in the world, just as historians today have to take into 
account the new reality of international politics, although in the twenty first century 
the tendency has been to write pragmatic ‘world histories’ as opposed to ‘universal 
histories’.  Within this interpretative framework, Hegel’s Philosophy of  History has become 
essentially an old-fashioned curiosity in an age when historical knowledge has 
expanded enormously.  It is not so much a philosophy of history as a highly speculative 
account of the history of the world founded on a very incomplete, limited and, to a 
certain extent, prejudiced knowledge of that history, the knowledge being that of a late 
eighteenth century German intellectual. 
A philosophy of history in the twenty first century will be something quite different.  
It must engage with the process of creating history as a human activity and the 
relationship between that process and the knowledge of the world and its past, which is 
like restoring a mosaic in which most of the pieces have been broken or are missing.  
Philosophy of History is thus primarily a discursive practice as it detaches words from 
things32, and constructs meaningful sequences of past occurrences which inform the 
present and thus prefigure the future.    It is a form of ‘meta-activity’ in that it looks 
beyond the mere creation of history in all its manifestations and reflects on the process 
involved in that creation.  It seeks to understand philosophically history as something 
which human beings do and is constitutive of their ‘being-in-the-world’, especially once 
they possess the capacity to create ‘history’ in a fixed form.  It would appear that for 
literate peoples’ history, in its various manifestations, looms large as a means of 
approaching and understanding the world of experience and their relationship with it.    
Discourse expresses itself primarily in language, and is fundamentally temporal.33 
Human beings tell stories as a means of explaining aspects of the world, in particular 
those aspects which pertain to the actions of human beings.  This may be the case 
because only human beings have a sense of change over time and must account for the 
meaning, function and purpose of that change. By means of narration they weave 
themselves into the world of experience and thus articulate intelligibility and generate 
meaning. In this way discourse becomes constitutive of the existence of human beings 
                                                          
32 M Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge and the Discourse of Language, New York, Pantheon Books, 1972, 
pp. 48-49. 
33  Heidegger, Being and Time, H349 (d) , p. 400. 
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in the world.34   
It is thus irrelevant whether these stories have a basis in what actually happened or 
take the form of fictional accounts which do not pretend to describe the real.  Legends 
grow up alongside facts.  Nineteenth century English schoolboys ‘knew’ that when he 
was six or seven, Oliver Cromwell had ‘had a pugilistic encounter with Prince Charles, 
afterwards Charles 1’, and that somehow this explained the English Civil War.35 At 
times, it may be difficult to distinguish between legend and history, given the state of 
knowledge, as in the case of biographies of Alexander the Great and the Alexander 
Legend. There is an episode in a number of supposedly reputable accounts, including 
Curtius’ History of  Alexander, in which Alexander spends thirteen days making love to 
the Queen of the Amazons.36 Over time, however, Alexander mutated into a 
legendary figure, especially in the various forms of the Alexander legend.  In the 
Alexander Legend, for example, his true father is not Philip but Nectanebo, the last 
Pharaoh of Egypt and a magician.37  However, in the Apocalypse of Pseudo-Methodius 
Philip is his father while his mother is Chouseth an Ethiopian princess while in the 
Shahnameh, Alexander has a Greek mother and a Persian father who casts off  
Alexander’s mother because she has bad breath.38  These stories cannot be just 
dismissed as the folk stories of ignorant people.  These were how even educated people 
understood the past.  Otto of Freising, for example, mentions the story about 
Nectanebo in his universal history.39  Equally the story of Alexander locking up Gog 
and Magog behind a wall in the north is in both Pseudo-Methodius and the Quran.40   
 Even in our own day, there are works of what are now considered to be pseudo 
history, as in the case of A T Fomenko and Gavin Menzies, which portray themselves 
as true but which are rejected by reputable historians. Consequently, the ultimate goal 
of historical narration is not the search or revelation of an absolute truth but rather the 
creation of a meaning and identity.  Fomenko, for example, has created a new narrative 
of human history which creates a way of understanding human history which appeals 
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to post-communist Russians.41 
This accounts for why in history, as in fictional writing, there are a variety of genres 
depending on how one approaches the nature of time.  In fiction, the ‘story’ can 
possess a sense of timelessness as if it has been plucked out of the stream of time and 
placed into an eternal domain in which time proceeds without any real growth and 
decay. The One Thousand and One Nights is emblematic in this regard as the narrator’s life 
depends on the infinite stream of stories without end she can weave night after night. 
Stories ward off the ontological possibility of death and allow time to continue its 
journey.  The historical equivalent of the story is the anecdote or moral tale, such as 
Plutarch’s Lives, or perhaps medieval hagiography which are designed to provide 
edifying models for behaviour.  These are exemplars which allow the narrative to move 
outside the temporal flux while maintaining the resemblance of a self-contained 
narrative. Even the aphorism, with its apparent universal, a-temporal and axiomatic 
nature, can be considered an attempt to overcome the temporality of human existence 
and the world. 
Nevertheless, even in the cases of the story and the moral tale or anecdote the 
central issue is that of time and the way in which human beings relate to it.  Mutability 
and change are dealt with by removing narrative from the realm of time and placing it 
under the jurisdiction of eternity.  This is the place, the only place, where human 
beings can live ‘happily ever after’.  It is the place which Flaubert subverted at the end 
of Madame Bovary and in the Three Stories, especially in ‘A Simple Heart’.  It is arguable 
that real stories cannot be written under the condition of modernity with its 
overbearing sense of change and flux.  Hence perhaps the greatest story teller of the 
twentieth century, Isak Dinesen, placed nearly all of her stories on the cusp of 
modernity, in that lingering, long last moment just before the forces of progress pricked 
the bubble of eternity.  Hence her final story, published after her death in 1963, has an 
old lady describing the setting for the story as a country which ‘may be said to have 
faded out of existence.’ 42 
But in a sense the story/moral tale is a special case of ‘history’, which can be seen 
as an attempt to come to terms with the reality of change over time, or of the fact that 
the world is not in a state of being but of becoming, and what this means for the nature 
of human beings as they exist in the world.  If philosophy of history is to have any 
explanatory power, there are a number of things it needs to consider. 
The first is the problem of change or, to be more precise, of explaining why 
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becoming rather than being is the defining characteristic of the universe which humans 
inhabit.  It is undeniable that the world is in a state of constant flux and while that 
change may have some regularity, such as the alternation of day and night and of the 
seasons, there are also irregular and chance events, at least from a human perspective, 
which threaten human existence, ranging from weather events to natural disasters to 
the possibility of a cosmic catastrophe.  In short, there is no stability or certainty for 
human beings and for human affairs.  A universe which was founded on being would 
be timeless because there is no place for time or change in a perfect universe defined 
by being. The latter is, however, an illusion produced by the desire of overcoming the 
ephemeral nature of human life. Human beings perceive themselves as subjects living 
in a finite spatio-temporal dimension known as the world. Their thought processes and 
linguistic production are dominated by rigid rules of logic and grammar, and these 
processes are inherently sequential or chronological. It would be possible therefore to 
assume that time is the production of human thought and discourse having not 
external or factual existence. Although such modal realism would assist in explaining 
the fictional nature of historical thinking and narrative, it is falsified by empirical 
observation. Therefore, a perfect universe could only exist in eternity like an abstract 
mathematical formula, or a story forever being repeated.  Considered philosophically, 
history comes out of the human need to come to terms with a universe which is always 
changing and in flux.  It is difficult to know when human beings came to appreciate the 
relentless nature of change although in the theme of attempting to escape death it can 
be found in the world’s oldest work of literature, The Epic of  Gilgamesh.  Although the 
reality of change, and its stepchild death, cannot be evaded, it can be tamed through 
representation be it artistic, literary or, in more recent times, digital.  As is the case with 
the story, history allows human beings to give shape and form to change, to tame it in 
the imagination, if not in reality.   
A universe which is characterised by change and becoming is also one which is 
imperfect in nature.  Things change and mutate; even if they achieve ‘being’, which 
might be described as their perfect form, the nature of time is such they cannot 
maintain that form and are destined to lose it.  Time changes all things.  But this 
change is often masked by language, so that things which change retain the same 
name.  This may not matter where objects of nature are concerned.  A stone remains a 
stone and cats vary little from generation to generation.  However, complex human 
creations, the creations of culture, change over time; history is the record of their 
mutation.  Things change, but the word used to name them remains the same.  For 
example, a democratic political system in 2016 is quite different from the same system 
of 1916, even if the words used to describe it are still largely the same.   
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The stability, or apparent timelessness, of language masks very real change.  It 
creates the illusion of ‘being’, of a world which appears not to change.  Consequently, 
the reality of change is only discoverable through intensive enquiry, which is to say 
historical investigation; it is no wonder that most people mistake the stable word for the 
ever-changing thing.  This inability to discern change, or the masking of change by 
language, is best termed the ‘tyranny of the concept’.  The apparent timelessness of the 
word or logos is a major impediment to human self-understanding; a proper 
philosophy of history should be the principal antidote to this human failing.  It strips 
away the illusion of ‘being’ from human ‘being in the world’ which also means that it 
strips away the comfort which being supplies. 
As such, language is a primary means for creating a measure of stability in the 
world because the apparent fixed quality of the logos, as opposed to the actual 
constantly changing world, is created by words making things which are changing seem 
to be always the same.  This stability may be a condition of our ‘being-in-the-world’ (is 
it possible to cope with a world in flux AND a constantly changing means of grasping 
that reality?).  But it means that language can only ever provide at best an approximate 
account of reality.  Words make things seem the same even as those things differ, but it 
does not matter if that difference between things is not great.  There are many shades 
of blue, and the word ‘blue’ is a blunt instrument, but in most circumstances differences 
in the abstract concept ‘blue’ do not affect the way in which we use it.  It would make a 
difference if an appreciation of the various shades of blue were essential for our 
survival, for example if some things of a particular bluish colour were poisonous.  A R 
Luria demonstrates in Cognitive Development: Its Cultural and Social Foundations that colour 
is an abstract concept and that colours exist only as the expression of concrete entities 
amongst illiterate peoples.43  
It is remarkable how impoverished a language such as English is when it comes to 
abstract nouns which deal with cultural and political matters such as ‘love’, ‘state’ (in 
the political sense) and ‘religion’.  It would appear to be the case that developed literate 
societies move away from a concrete and particularistic linguistic means of describing 
the world to one in which abstract nouns become increasingly dominant.  In particular, 
this linguistic poverty makes historical understanding very difficult.  Should one, for 
example, translate res publica as state or does such a translation do violence to the thing 
we are studying? Even historians of Rome now concede that res publica masks several 
different types of regime.44   This poverty of language creates a sense of timelessness in 
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history, masking behind a word both difference and change.  The apparent 
timelessness of language means that human beings do not always notice as the water 
gets hotter and boils. 
It is curious that human beings who are encouraged, under the condition of 
modernity, to seek change, and to go in quest of constant innovation, have not created 
techniques enabling language to be adapted so that it can monitor and foster awareness 
of the changing world around them.  Any philosophy of history must account for this 
very human tendency towards thinking which is atemporal in nature.  It would appear 
that human beings, considered in terms of the means which they use to understand the 
world, are quite resistant to grasping the world as a dynamic entity.  This may indicate 
a certain unhappiness about being placed in a world which has becoming as its central 
feature.  It may also explain the attraction of a digital reality in the twenty first century.  
One can create a digital persona online which never changes, even in its pictorial 
representation. 
Human beings seem to be disappointed with the universe which they inhabit and 
crave ‘being’ in the sense of stability and orderliness.  They wish, especially when times 
are good, that things will not change and that moments of perfection will last forever.  
Consider the example of the mystic who has achieved an epiphany, a moment of 
perfect unity with the universe.  That moment is, by definition, momentary.  The 
individual must return to the universe of change and flux and endure the imperfection 
of that universe.  The same is true when more mundane and materialist concerns are 
involved; good times never last forever and are followed by economic crises and wars.  
In response, humans create the idea of ‘golden ages’ when the times were good and 
people were happy, as originally depicted by Hesiod.  Or perhaps the ideal of ‘Pax 
Romana’.   This leads to attempts to conquer time in politics, as Polybius believed that 
the Romans had achieved through their mixed constitution.45 
Then there is Eden and the return to the primal unity. Change is wearying and its 
effects can be debilitating.  The idea that there was once a time when the effects of 
change were not felt, and the faith that such a time may come again in the future, are 
very attractive for many people.  It may not be so attractive for the affluent few in the 
modern West who do not feel the effects of change as deeply as most people have 
throughout history. They seek other ways of conquering time, and hopefully death, 
through the techniques of science. 
One major consequence of the reality of a universe founded on becoming is the 
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necessary plasticity of human nature.46   Human beings and the culture which they 
create are necessarily plastic because the world is both imperfect and changing and 
they can only come to terms with change if they possess a nature which enables them 
to adapt and change accordingly.  Language is a major means through which human 
beings deal with change.  But language has to work in tandem with practice; it is 
through changes in practice that human beings come to terms with their changing 
world, by altering the technology which they use to deal with the world.  Practices 
change and languages change, but it is difficult to know how these two sets of changes 
interact.  Nevertheless, it might be argued that the plasticity involved in the 
development of practices and those involved in the development of words are not only 
distinct but may go in quite different directions.  This process may accelerate under the 
conditions of modernity.   
Under certain conditions words easily lose their connection with reality.  This is 
what seems to constitute the postmodern condition.  When this happens, it becomes 
possible to create fanciful histories, such as discussed earlier.  This is the great danger 
of modernity, especially as it becomes increasingly digital and fragmented, and 
individuals, because of the pervasiveness of communication technology and the 
creation of virtual worlds, become more narcissist, egocentric and disengaged from 
reality.  In such a condition, which is reminiscent of Rousseau’s warning against the 
increasingly growing incidence of the civil state in human life, which causes a 
destructive amour-propre to replace an innocent amour de soi,47 not only does what 
remains of the distinction between history and fiction appear to vanish, but politics and 
policy seem to dissolve into a rhetoric detached from reality. An abstract language may 
be the consequence of a more universal human existence but there is a price to be paid 
for that abstraction and part of that price involves our understanding of history and 
hence of human life. 
Plasticity is also why human beings require an imagination to enable them to 
envisage things as being other than they currently are.  Of course, the imagination may 
lead them into incorrect conclusions and, if used to excess, encourage human beings to 
pursue what are essentially fantasies.  These fantasies may become more dominant 
once writing has been adopted and words and ideas take on a quasi-permanent form 
which places them in an independent position from the person using them.   No longer 
can they be easily changed as occurs in an oral culture.  History is thus a reification of 
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the past, the creation of a semi-permanent structure which limits the capacity of the 
imagination to re-make the past in accordance with the needs of the present and the 
future.  Does this then perhaps mean that history is a form of congealed past created 
by the imagination which in turn effectively works to constrain the imagination?  It is 
worth remembering that this congealed past may not actually be true, as in the case of 
the many stories about Alexander; in the absence of evidence from other sources it 
may simply be impossible to know how true it is.  History, then, takes the plasticity of 
human experience, or at least completed experience, and gives it a fixed form and 
shape.  In this way it enables human beings to chart their passage through time and to 
make sense of it.  It takes the terror out of the flux and change of the universe. 
In this sense history is both about recognising change, as opposed to reducing the 
universe to a timeless ‘being’, and simultaneously ensuring that the threat which 
‘becoming’ entails is somehow tamed and made less threatening.  Human beings both 
crave being and have a plastic nature which reminds them constantly that they inhabit 
a realm of becoming.  One way in which they do this is through stories; history is a 
special kind of story in that it aspires to be true.  The great virtue of stories is that they 
appeal to both the cognitive and the affective elements of human nature; they engage 
people in a way in which rules, precepts and laws, which stand outside of history, do 
not.  A philosophy of history concerns itself with the relationship between ‘becoming’ 
which produces human plasticity and finitude, and the way in which history provides a 
form of ‘being’ for that process of becoming by giving it a form and a shape through 
the imposition of logos. 
The historical instinct came into being through historical memory and literacy.  
Without a written record, which establishes the historical narrative, there are only ever 
changing oral accounts, which can change as the needs of the person providing the 
story change.48  There are a variety of written accounts of the past but once they have 
been written down it becomes possible to compare them and to decide which one is the 
superior account.  This is not to say that history is always concerned with establishing 
‘what is the case’.  Both Greek and Roman historians inserted speeches into their 
histories for which they did not possess any evidence.  They were there for rhetorical 
effect.  Nor, as the case of the Alexander legend demonstrates, does the writing down 
of a story necessarily prevent it from mutating and evolving in different contexts. 
History is also largely the creation of prose.  Only rarely has an author attempted 
to write history in verse and it is difficult to see what other genre could be used to write 
history and its step sibling, the chronicle.  In comparison, philosophy has used many 
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genres, including poetry, ranging from the dialogue to the treatise to commentary.  But 
history only seems to work when its mode is ‘plodding prose’.  It is very much 
concerned with establishing with what it understands to be a true account of the past 
which can be accepted as authoritative.  Most people do not have the opportunity to 
check the original sources.  Hence, they must accept much of what they read in a work 
of history ‘on trust’ without generally appreciating that what is before them may be 
built on quite flimsy foundations.  It becomes even worse when one aggregates these 
various histories and attempts to create a so-called universal history.  Universal history, 
which is generally created by writers who do not know the various particular areas of 
which it is composed in detail, is often like a multi storey building which has very 
shallow foundations.  It is the mode of history which is relies most heavily on the 
imagination and its capacity to take a relatively small number of (usually broken) tiles 
and create a full mosaic.  At one level, universal history creates the most 
comprehensive picture of the past, and hence the one most likely to bring a sense of 
comfort to any individual, while at another level it fashions the flimsiest of all historical 
constructions, one which is the easiest to demolish.  Any philosophy of history needs to 
recognise that the historical instinct is at both its strongest, and its weakest, at the level 
of attempts to create universal history.  It is at its strongest because here history comes 
closest to fulfilling its role in taming time and allowing an individual to feel at ease in 
the universe.  It is at its weakest because universal history is much easier to destroy 
because it has such shallow foundations.  One cannot have both a high level of truth 
and a high level of explanatory power.  The more that history attempts to explain the 
more likely it is to be false.  Taming time on a grand scale may simply mean accepting 
the fictional nature of the history one creates. 
Is it not also the case that history comes into its own at times of great change?   If 
history is about taking the sting out of the effects which time has on human beings, 
then change should stimulate the desire to ‘make’ history as an antidote to that change. 
This may well be the case with the Old Testament which is the creation of a time of 
change in the sixth century BC.  It is what stimulates both Herodotus and Thucydides 
in fifth century Athens, the creation of historical writing in the late Roman republic, 
including the universal history of Diodorus, and perhaps also Christian writing.  
Leaving aside the early Gospel writing, when the Church becomes important in the 
early fourth century we have the Church history of Eusebius and his attempt to create 
a universal history through his chronology.  Islam creates a history for itself out of the 
hadith and other oral traditions.49  Does this mean that when changes occur in a society 
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with at least a literate minority the use of written texts is used to gain control of the past 
as a means of controlling the present?  For example, Herodotus is an apologist for the 
democratic regime in Athens; the past becomes a means of both providing ‘significant 
past’ for the democratic order while giving some advice about what that past entails for 
the future, namely the example of the Persian Empire. 
History then comes out of what is best described as the tragic nature of human 
existence.  Time and its corrosive effects haunt all human beings because the universe 
tells them every day that change rules their lives and that death is ever closer.  There 
are times when that change becomes so overwhelming that human beings feel an 
overpowering desire to control time, to make sense of it and prevent it from engulfing 
them.  History is one expression of that desire.  Historians desire that their accounts of 
the past both be true and an antidote to the effects of change.  It is very difficult for 
history to take on both of these functions.  The more it tries to explain the more it 
discovers that it has to engage the services of that unreliable faculty, the imagination, 
and the more likely it is to sacrifice truth.  The less it attempts to explain and remains 
‘true to the facts’, the less comforting it will be as an antidote to change.  That is the 
paradox which any philosopher of history has to face. 
The practice of this thing called ‘history’ is not universal in human existence, and is 
more prevalent in some civilisations and cultures than in others.  It is an artefact of the 
plastic human mind and the desire of the mind both to ward off the terrors which a 
constantly evolving universe poses and to establish some sort of control over that 
constant change.  It only really comes into being once a people has become literate.  
The desire to exercise some control over the past is equally motivated by an aspiration 
also to master the future.  This can only be done by enlisting the power of the 
imagination, especially the imagination as it comes to be expressed in the written word.  
An authoritative written text can be a thing of great comfort as well as one of great 
power. 
There can be no doubt that what can be loosely termed Western civilisation is 
marked by the strength of its historical approach to understanding the universe. This is 
linked to the desire by the peoples of the West to control their world and make it 
subservient to them.  This desire for control can be summed up in an image of a 
chariot being drawn by twin horses named science and history.  In the twenty first 
century those horses are becoming increasingly digital in nature.  But, as we have 
argued elsewhere, control is not the same thing as knowing.50  It is a means to 
possessing power over something even if it means doing violence to that thing.  Out of 
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attempts to control history come such things as the idea of progress and a belief in the 
destiny of a particular country or civilisation.   The illusion of control manifests itself in 
a large number of fanciful political projects, many of which have done great harm to 
many people.  The historical enterprise in the West has too often been blind to its 
desire for control, and unwilling, and/or unable, to see that its quest for control and 
power may have blinded it to what it is doing when it engages in the historical 
enterprise.  The imagination can indeed contain many deceitful demons.  
Philosophy in the twenty first century must come to terms not only with the role 
which science has taken in contemporary (Western) culture but also that of history.  
History is a constitutive element of modernity understood as a Western creation.  Just 
as science requires a metaphysics which provides an explanation of the universe which 
enables us to understand both the nature of science and its limitations, so History must 
also be examined in a similar fashion.51  This means, as has been argued above, that 
Philosophy of history must take quite a different form to which it took in the past. 
History is a constitutive element of modernity understood as a Western creation.  
Philosophy of history must recognise the way in which history has come to be and the 
role that it has come to occupy as a way of explaining human being-in-the-world.  
History cannot be considered as a simple enterprise in which human beings seek to 
know the past as it really was.  That enterprise is impossible, if only because human 
beings always live in the present. Rather history is an attempt by people in a literate 
condition to establish a relationship between human beings and a universe marked by 
constant and relentless change so that they can aspire to having some sort of control 
over that universe.  It is driven by the tragedy of the human condition which is that of 
an entity which can desire a condition of being through its imagination, but which 
ultimately is subject to a relentless becoming and the ultimate fate which becoming 
entails. 
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